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FOREIGNERS IN BURMA: A FRAMEWORK FOR
RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT
Rachel E. Ryon †
Abstract: Burma is hailed as a great democratic success story: a once-rogue
nation holding elections, releasing political prisoners, and promising human rights
reforms. The people elected to Parliament Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the
democratic movement who was under house arrest for more than twenty years. The
world responded with applause and open pocketbooks. In April of 2012, Ban Ki-moon,
Secretary General of the United Nations, asked members to lift their sanctions on the
formerly “rogue” nation and begin investing. But for a resource-rich country with a long
track record of corruption, this flood of foreign investment will likely provide more
opportunities for human rights violations and environmental destruction.
Burma’s Parliament recently revised the country’s foreign investment law to
provide guidelines for its new investors. Given Burma’s relatively new Constitution and
brand new foreign investment law, what will the legal landscape regarding the protection
of human rights and the environment look like during this time of transition and
economic acceleration? Foreign investors should agree to undertake projects only where
impact benefit agreements are successfully negotiated, proceed cautiously in Burma’s
historically corrupt oil and gas industry, and engage in non-financial reporting in order to
ensure compliance with international human rights and environmental standards.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In September of 2012 the Obama administration formally lifted nearly
all of the economic sanctions against Burma1 that had been in place since the
late 1990s.2 The United States’ move coincided with many other Western
countries’ similar easing of trade sanctions against the former pariah nation.3
These changes were in response to the reforms enacted by Burmese
President Thein Sein over the previous year.4 After President Thein Sein
†

The author would like to thank Professor Stephen Rosenbaum and Paul Donowitz for their support
and guidance, and the editors of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their hard work and dedication.
The author would also like to acknowledge the work of human rights groups such as Free Burma Rangers,
the U.S. Campaign of Burma, Partners Relief and Development, and EarthRights International, whose work
inspired this comment.
1
Many call the country by its former name, Burma, which the ruling military junta changed to
“Myanmar” in 1989. The author will refer to the country as Burma, but will retain the language used by
the individual sources when referencing their statements.
2
Sam Holmes & Celine Fernandez, Myanmar Awaits Sanction-Lift Effect: Impact of U.S. Move to
Ease Export Ban Could Take Years Because of Poor Infrastructure, Preparedness, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28,
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044454920457802219312 0833754.html.
3
Annie Lowrey, U.S. Sanctions on Myanmar Formally Eased, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/world/asia/us-sanctions-on-myanmar-formally-eased.html?r=0.
4
Burma Sanctions: Obama Lifts Restrictions on U.S. Firms, BBC NEWS (July 12, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18798162.
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was sworn in as leader of a “nominally civilian government,” he enacted a
series of democratic reforms.5 These reforms granted amnesty to political
prisoners, allowed peaceful demonstrations, freed Aung San Suu Kyi from
house arrest, and recognized her party’s win in the 2012 parliamentary
elections.6
Foreign investors are anxious to explore development opportunities in
this resource-rich country, especially in the oil and gas sector, now that
sanctions have been relaxed or altogether eliminated.7 In 2010–11, Burma’s
revenues from natural gas exports exceeded USD 2.5 billion, and were
expected to increase to over USD 4.1 billion in 2013.8 Oil companies
consider Burma “under-explored,” and believe there are vast amounts of oil
and gas yet to be discovered.9 An official from China’s North Petro-Chem
Corporation (Myanmar) Ltd. called Burma a “sleeping petroleum giant.”10
One economist notes, “the country has been walled away for fifty years.
There are incredible opportunities. That’s why the planes are full, that’s why
the hotels are full.”11
However, Burma lacks robust infrastructure, especially reliable
electricity and stable banking systems, which may ultimately dissuade many
foreign investors.12 In 2012, Burma ranked 129 out of 155 countries on the
Logistics Performance scale, which assesses trade- and transportationrelated infrastructure.13 Even residents in commercial districts have limited
electricity and constant power cuts. 14 Factories must employ diesel
generators to support a constant flow of power.15 The banking sector is
5

Profile: Burma President Thein Sein, BBC NEWS (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-asia-pacific-12358204.
6
Timeline Reforms in Burma, BBC NEWS (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia16546688.
7
Rakteem Katakey, Myanmar Gets Record Investment After Years of Isolation: Energy, BUS. WK.
(Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-09-16/myanmar-gets-record-investment-afteryears-of-isolation-energy.
8
ARAKAN OIL WATCH, BURMA’S RESOURCE CURSE: THE CASE FOR REVENUE TRANSPARENCY IN
THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR 4 (2012). At the time of publication, no information on natural gas exports for
2013 was available.
9
Katakey, supra note 7.
10
Simon Lewis, Burma Govt Allows Oil and Gas Firms to Name Profit-Sharing Terms, THE
IRRAWADDY (Sep. 25, 2013), http://www.irrawaddy.org/economy/burma-govt-allows-oil-gas-firms-nameprofit-sharing-terms.html.
11
Economist Questions Burma’s Foreign Investment Law, MIZZIMA NEWS (Aug. 24, 2012),
http://archive-2.mizzima.com/business/7825-economist-questions-burmas-foreign-investment-law.html.
12
Id.
13
Justin Kent, Myanmar, The Last Frontier, FORBES (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
connorconnect/2012/11/09/myanmar-the-last-frontier/.
14
Id.
15
Id.
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underdeveloped, and until very recently, ran exclusively on cash
transactions.16
In response to these concerns, Burma recently revised its foreign
investment law (hereinafter “2012 Law”) to attract foreign investors and
their capital.17 As a result of the 2012 Law and Western countries’ loosening
sanctions, Burma will likely face a flood of new capital.18 This influx of
foreign investment, however, may worsen existing problems. Burma has a
long history of corruption and lacks transparency, especially in the oil and
gas sectors. 19 In addition, the government has a tense and fragile
relationship with ethnic minority populations, who historically suffered
abuse at the hands of extractive companies and the government itself.20 This
foreign capital may flow into investment projects that utilize forced labor,
forced relocation, and result in environmental destruction.21
In an attempt to address these concerns, the 2012 Law requires foreign
companies to respect the local environment and labor standards.22 However,
Burma’s judiciary is hardly equipped with the robust enforcement
mechanisms needed to ensure compliance.23 The government uses judicial
processes to silence dissidents.24 The UN Special Rapporteur for Human
Rights in Myanmar stated, “[t]here is no independent and impartial judiciary
system [in Burma].”25

16

Jason Szep, Myanmar Banking New “Wow” Factor – ATMs, REUTERS (May 30, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/30/us-myanmar-banking-idUSBRE84T04H20120530.
17
Kent, supra note 13.
18
Economist Questions Burma’s Foreign Investment Law, supra note 11; Burma ‘Enjoying
Investment Boom’, BBC NEWS (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20907285.
19
Dana Hughes & Molly Hunter, Obama Administration Declares Myanmar Open for Business
(May 19, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/05/obama-administration-declares-myanmaropen-for-business/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014); INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUS., No. 1, RESPONSIBLE
INVESTMENT IN MYANMAR: THE HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSION 7 (2012).
20
ARAKAN OIL WATCH, supra note 8, at 19.
21
See infra Part III. B.
22
Foreign Investment Law, 2012, No. 21, ch. 11, 2(4)(c) (Myan.), available at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf
[hereinafter
Foreign
Investment Law 2012].
23
See Dominic Nardi, Discipline-Flourishing Constitutional Review: A Legal and Political Analysis
of Myanmar’s New Constitutional Tribunal, 12 AUSTL. J. ASIAN LAW 1, 7-8 (2010).
24
For example, Zarganar, a famous Burmese comedian who mocked the ruling junta in his routines,
was convicted of “public order offenses,” and received a fifty-nine-year sentence. He was placed in
solitary confinement for four to five years of his sentence. Kyaw Hsu Mon, Burma Activists Urge Protest
Law Reform, THE IRRAWADDY (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.irrawaddy.org/human-rights/burma-activistsurge-protest-law-reform.html; Laura Barton, Burma’s Top Standup Comic: ‘We Sacrifice Our Lives for
Jokes”, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 9, 2912), http://www.theguardian.com/culture/2012/mar/09/burma-standupcomic-zarganar?guni=Article: in%20body%20link.
25
Nardi, supra note 23, at 8.
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In light of this reality, foreign companies may have to go above the
requirements of Burmese laws to ensure fair labor standards and safe
environmental practices. While it may be tempting to exploit this new
frontier, it is in the best interest of foreign companies to follow principles of
corporate social responsibility to ensure these protections, for, while they
may not be judged in a court of law, they will be judged in the court of
public opinion. Companies face significant risk of lawsuits in foreign or
international courts—foreign companies have already faced liability for
contracting with the military to provide security for their development
projects. 26 The world’s attention is turned toward Burma’s dramatic
democratization, and foreign investment projects will be under intense
scrutiny. Therefore, socially responsible investment is in the best economic
interest of companies.
This comment proceeds by examining the political, social, and
economic history of Burma leading up to the recent democratic reforms in
Part II. Part III analyzes the substantive changes in the foreign investment
law. The 2012 Law makes several substantive changes, including:
allowances for longer land grants, longer tax holidays, foreign currency
accounts, joint ventures between foreigners and citizens unrestricted by
ownership ratio requirements, and guarantees against nationalization. 27
While these changes may not address the long-term concerns of investors,
they will likely entice foreigners to invest in the short-term despite the
dangers of political instability and under-developed infrastructure.28 This
comment argues that the lack of domestic enforcement mechanisms will
likely ensure that the 2012 Law’s socially responsible goals remain
aspirational.
Part IV outlines recommendations for foreign investors doing business
in Burma. This comment recommends that foreign investors comply with
the law’s goal of promoting socially responsible investment by proceeding
cautiously in Burma’s historically corrupt oil and gas industry, engaging in
non-financial reporting, and negotiating impact benefit agreements to ensure
that international human rights, labor, and environmental laws are enforced.
26

See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (granting in part and denying in part
motion to dismiss), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc, 403 F.3d 708
(9th Cir. 2005) (granting parties’ stipulated motion to dismiss in light of settlement); A Milestone for
Human Rights, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 23, 2005), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/200501-23/a-milestone-for-human-rights (noting insider information that Unocal will pay $30 million in
damages to settle).
27
Aung Hla Tun, Myanmar State Media Details New Foreign Investment Law, REUTERS (Nov. 3,
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/03/us-myanmar-investment-idUSBRE8A204F20121103.
28
Economist Questions Burma’s Foreign Investment Law, supra note 11.
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BACKGROUND

Colonialism, decades of civil conflict, and repressive authoritarian
leaders have affected Burma’s economy and inhabitants disastrously.
Regional partners have taken a constructivist approach to their relations with
the formerly rogue 29 nation, while other states have imposed harsh
sanctions.30 While discussing the efficacy of the two competing approaches
is not the focus of this analysis, understanding the international context in
which the 2012 Law was passed is necessary to contemplate the legal
problems and pitfalls the country will face in its near future.
This section examines the failed political and economic policies
enacted by Burma in the post-colonial era and the tensions between the
government and indigenous communities. It goes on to analyze regional and
international responses to these crises, and the recent warming of relations
between Burma and other nations that set the stage for the 2012 Law.
A.

Political and Economic History

In 1886, Burma became a British colony.31 Led by Aung San, Burma
negotiated its independence by joining with the Allies to stop the Japanese
invasion of Burma in 1945.32 When framers drafted the constitution of postcolonial Burma, ethnic minority autonomy was a divisive issue. For decades
a strong ethnic nationalist sentiment had been growing, “based narrowly on
the idea of a Buddhist and Burmese-speaking people, one that saw little need
to accommodate minority peoples,”33 which currently make up about thirtyone percent of the population.34 Ultimately, the nationalist interests who
29

See, e.g., Ari B. Weiss, Revolutionary Identities and Competing Legitimacies: Why Pariah States
Export Violence 4 (May 11, 2012) (unpublished honors thesis, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale)
(on file with University Honors Program at OpenSIUC) (“Rogue state” refers to nations that reject
international norms by engaging in activities such as systematic human rights abuse, proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and supporting terrorism.).
30
Wayne Bert, Burma, China and the U.S.A, 77 PAC. AFF. 263, 277 (2004); Donald K. Emmerson,
Crisis and Consensus: America and ASEAN In A New Global Context 13 (paper presented at the
international conference sponsored by Chulalongkorn University’s American Studies Program, Institute of
Security and International Studies, and Faculty of Political Science, Hua Hin, Thailand, Jan. 8-9, 2009).
31
Mark B. Baker, Flying Over the Judicial Hump: A Human Rights Drama Featuring Burma, the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the WTO, and the Federal Courts, 32 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 51, 55
(2000-01).
32
IAN HOLLIDAY, BURMA REDUX: GLOBAL JUSTICE AND THE QUEST FOR POLITICAL REFORM IN
MYANMAR 38 (2011).
33
Id. at 34.
34
The Shan people constitute 9%, the Karen people constitute 7% and historically have resided in
the eastern region, the Rhakine people make up approximately 3.5% and reside in western Burma, the Chin
constitute 2.5% and have historically lived in western Burma near India, the Mon people make up 2% and
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preferred one “Union of Burma” rather than a multi-ethnic state won this
debate.35 In 1947, an assembly passed the new constitution, nominally
acknowledging the distinct states of the Shan, Kachin, Karen, and Karenni
tribes and giving them the option to secede from “unified Burma” ten years
later.36
However, many ethnic minority groups were deeply dissatisfied with
this arrangement and protested for independence. 37 Adding to these
tensions, Aung San, the only leader supported by both the Burmans and the
ethnic minority groups, was assassinated, catapulting the newly independent
nation into civil war on January 4, 1948.38 In the 1950s, while insurrections
were common, Burma progressed democratically by holding nominally fair
elections and establishing parliament, a bureaucracy, and an independent
judiciary.39 But popular distrust of government institutions led to unrest, and
the military positioned itself as the unifying state institution.40 The country
operated under a parliamentary democracy until 1962, when a military coup
put General Ne Win and the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(“SLORC”) in power for the next twenty-six years.41
Burma experienced huge economic growth during the colonial period,
but its economy plummeted in the years following independence: in 1930
the GDP per capita was USD 902, but it dropped to USD 396 in 1950.42
After the British withdrew, the economy collapsed.43 Burma is rich in
natural resources, but the government’s mismanagement of its own
resources kept the country impoverished. 44 Ne Win ordered the
nationalization of most industries.45 He also demonetized the kyat in 1987,
ordering that the kyat only exist in denominations divisible by his favorite
live in the southern end, and the Kachin make up 1.5% and reside in the north bordering China. Some of
the other ethnic groups are the Wa, Rohingya, and Karenni. UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, Briefing:
Myanmar’s Ethnic Problems, IRINNEWS (Mar. 29, 2012),
http://www.irinnews.org /report/95195/Briefing-Myanmar-s-ethnic-problems.
35
HOLLIDAY, supra note 32, at 39.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 40.
38
See generally Baker, supra note 31, at 63, 68.
39
HOLLIDAY, supra note 32, at 43.
40
Id. at 44-45.
41
Sein Win, Sustaining Burma’s Hopes for Freedom, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 144, 145 (1994).
42
Wonik Kim, Rethinking Colonialism and the Origins of the Developmental State in East Asia, 39
J. CONTEMP. ASIA 382, 389 (2009).
43
Id. at 389.
44
INT’L CRISIS GROUP, ASIA REPORT NO. 177, CHINA’S MYANMAR DILEMMA 22 (2009) (stating that
Burma’s economic problems “can be linked to a fundamental lack of knowledge and expertise on economic
planning and policy.”).
45
The Ne Win Years: 1962-1988, THE OXFORD BURMA ALLIANCE, http://www.oxfordburma
alliance.org/1962-coup--ne-win-regime.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
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number, nine, leaving only forty-five and ninety kyat bills.46 Without any
forewarning or compensation, seventy-five percent of Burma’s currency was
completely devalued, people lost their entire life savings overnight,47 and
foreign businesses were forced out.48 Foreign investors withdrew as a result
of Ne Win’s policies.49 The World Bank notes that net inflows of Foreign
Direct Investment in Burma (indicating new investment inflows less
disinvestment) fell from USD 780,000 in 1984 to USD -1,540,000 in 1987.50
These failed economic policies led to social unrest and political
upheaval, resulting in mass protests in 1988, when government forces killed
an estimated 3,000 people.51 The military government renamed itself the
State Peace and Development Council (“SPDC”), promising democracy in
order to regain lost international trust and foreign investment.52 The Saffron
Revolution of 2007 brought the crisis in Burma to international attention
again, when the world watched the SPDC violently crush a peaceful protest
of Buddhist monks.53 General distrust of the government and popular unrest
increased during this time period and exacerbated ethnic tensions.54
B.

Ethnic Minority Conflicts
“…[I]n ten years all Karen will be dead. If you want to see a
Karen, you will have to go to a museum in Rangoon.” MajorGeneral Ket Sein, 1992. 55

Residual animosity between the government and ethnic minority
groups stems from the colonial-era conflict centering on the establishment of
a “unified Burma” rather than autonomous ethnic states.56 In response to
46

Id.
INT’L CRISIS GROUP, ASIA REPORT NO. 231, MYANMAR: THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 1
(July 2012).
48
Id.
49
The Ne Win Years: 1962-1988, supra note 45.
50
Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?page=4 (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
51
Burma’s 1988 Protests, BBC NEWS (Sep. 25, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/7012158.stm; Crisis in Burma: Can the U.S. Bring About a Peaceful Resolution?: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Asia, the Pac., and the Global Env’t of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 1
(2007) [hereinafter Crisis in Burma]; HOLLIDAY, supra note 32, at 55.
52
Crisis in Burma, supra note 51, at 3.
53
Id. at 2.
54
See generally Crisis in Burma, supra note 51.
55
BENEDICT ROGERS & JEREMY WOODRUM, THAN SHWE: UNMASKING BURMA’S TYRANT 149
(2009) (citing BENEDICT ROGERS, A LAND WITHOUT EVIL 40 (2004)).
56
Id.
47
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ethnic groups’ armed insurrections, the government targeted these groups
through repression and “insensitive development projects.” 57 The junta
conducted a multi-decade campaign against the ethnic groups, utilizing
forced displacement, forced labor, and intentional deprivation of healthcare
and food. 58 Researchers have documented the military’s practice of
systematically entering villages, raping and/or killing villagers they find,
burning the village, and then setting landmines for those who may return to
recover any belongings or loved ones.59 Others are forced into relocation
camps and used as laborers, porters, and human landmine sweepers for the
military.60
This “Four Cuts Strategy” was employed by the junta specifically to
make room for and quell resistance to development projects like gas
pipelines.61 This practice drew significant criticism from the International
Labor Organization (“ILO”), especially given Burma’s ratification of the
Forced Labor Convention.62 The ILO stated that the military, which targets
civilians solely on the basis of their ethnicity,63 is “guilty of an international
crime that is also, if committed in a widespread or systematic manner, a
crime against humanity.”64
Even now, the government continues to violate the cease-fire
agreements and has instigated attacks on civilians.65 Only days after the
government signed a cease-fire agreement that was to put an end to the
Kachin offensive, the Burma army began burning down houses in the Na
Long village in Kachin state.66 The long-standing ethnic tensions will not
likely be resolved overnight, and these are factors that investors should keep
57

HOLLIDAY, supra note 32, at 95.
Jeremy Sarkin & Marek Pietschmann, Legitimate Humanitarian Intervention Under International
Law in the Context of the Current Human Rights and Humanitarian Crisis in Burma/Myanmar, 33 HONG
KONG L. J. 371, 378-80 (2003).
59
See, e.g., FREE BURMA RANGERS, A CAMPAIGN OF BRUTALITY: REPORT AND ANALYSIS OF
BURMA ARMY OFFENSIVE AND ONGOING ATTACKS AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN KAREN STATE,
EASTERN BURMA, UPDATED (2008).
60
Sarkin & Pietschmann, supra note 58, at 8.
61
DLA PIPER RUDNICK GRAY CARY, THREAT TO PEACE: A CALL FOR THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
TO ACT IN BURMA 17 (2005).
62
Sarkin & Pietschmann, supra note 58, at 10.
63
DLA PIPER RUDNICK GRAY CARY, supra note 61, at 35; Crisis in Burma, supra note 51, at 34
(noting the junta destroyed more than 3,000 villages, twice as many as were destroyed in the crisis in
Darfur).
64
Sarkin & Pietschmann, supra note 58, at 10.
65
FREE BURMA RANGERS, FBR REPORT: BURMA ARMY ATTACKS AGAINST THE KACHIN SINCE
CEASEFIRE DECLARED (2013); Fighting Continues in Burma Despite Ceasefire, BBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21190975 (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
66
Id.
58
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in mind when developing projects in areas historically inhabited by these
marginalized community members.
Poor economic policies led the country to poverty, and political and
ethnic oppression resulted in constant unrest and violence. While this much
is clear, the international response to Burma’s failed policies has been
inconsistent, and states have adopted vastly different approaches to their
relations with the nation.
C.

Foreign Relations: Regional and Beyond

The events in the late 1980s and early 1990s served as a catalyst for
new foreign relation policies in Burma. Regional states tended to adopt a
constructive engagement approach toward Burma, while its Western partners
responded with sanctions and embargos.
Burma’s neighbors have invested and traded with it for the stated
goals of creating an empowered middle class and political base.67 The
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”)68 members provided
one fourth of all foreign direct investment in Burma in the ten-year period
between 1995 and 2005, totaling USD 1.05 billion.69
Generally, Western nations responded to Burma’s human rights
abuses and the regime’s illegitimacy with mild to harsh isolationist
policies.70 The low point in foreign relations between Burma and many
Western nations was the violent suppression of the student uprising in 1988,
accompanied by the regime’s refusal to recognize the results of the 1990
election that Aung San Suu Kyi won by a landslide.71 Instead, she was
placed under house arrest along with other prominent members of her party,
the National League for Democracy (“NLD”), and she remained there off
and on for the next twenty years.72 In response to these events, the United
67

Aurélie Basha i Novosejt, E.U. Policy on Burma/Myanmar: Trade, Investment and Political
Trends of the Past Decade and their Implications for Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy in
Burma/Myanmar 19 (2006) (unpublished report).
68
Burma sought out a seat at ASEAN and received it in 1997, notably one month after the U.S.
imposed harsher sanctions. Bert, supra note 30, at 270-71; id. at 16.
69
Patrick Strefford, Exclusionary Globalization:
Sanctions, Military Rule, and NonDemocratization in Myanmar, in GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 59, 66
(Derrick M. Nault & Shawn L. England, eds., Palgrave Macmillan 2011).
70
Jayshree Bajoria, Understanding Myanmar, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/understanding-myanmar/p14385 (June 21, 2013); Bert, supra note 30, at
277.
71
Sein Win, supra note 41, at 146-47 (noting the National League for Democracy, or NLD, led by
Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of Aung San, won 82% of the parliamentary seats).
72
Id.
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States halted its aid program and military assistance, and then imposed
sanctions, which were renewed in 2008.73
Likewise, the European Union imposed an arms embargo in 1990 and
at the same time suspended most assistance other than humanitarian aid.74
The E.U. also exempted Burma from its “Generalised Scheme of
Preference,” thus excluding European markets as opportunities for trade.75
The United States and the European Union tightened their sanctions
following the Saffron Revolution of 2007.76 Australia also adopted financial
sanctions restricting the “transfer of funds or payments to, by the order of, or
on behalf of specified Burmese regime figures and supporters” in 2007.77
Scholars argue that isolationist policies disproportionately hurt the
country imposing the sanctions because other countries are free to trade with
and invest in the sanctioned country.78 This played out in Burma as China
became Burma’s number one investor, comprising eighty-seven percent of
all foreign investment in 2011.79 Scholars and commentators argued that
Burma essentially became a “client state” of China.80 Burma came to rely
on China as its main supplier of intelligence, arms, and financial
assistance.81 China also offered Burma an unknown amount of debt relief
that helped to keep the regime afloat,82 and in exchange for this and its
continued investment, Burma gave Chinese contractors an advantage in bids
for contracts, specifically in the manufacturing, mining, power generation,
and oil and gas sectors.83

73

David I. Steinberg, The United States and Myanmar: A ‘Boutique Issue’?, 86 INT’L AFF. 175,
181-82 (2010). New rounds of sanctions were imposed in 1997, 2003, and again in 2008.
74
Novosejt, supra note 67, at 8.
75
Id. at 9.
76
CAMERON HILL, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA, DEPARTMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY SERVICES,
BURMA: DOMESTIC REFORMS AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 1 (2012).
77
Id.; Ray Brindal, Australia Removes Economic Sanctions on Myanmar, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 16,
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304299304577346570095628952.htm.
78
Bert, supra note 30, at 277-79.
79
IAN STOREY, SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE RISE OF CHINA: THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY 161 (2011).
80
STRATEGIC STUD. INST., SHAPING CHINA’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLE’S
LIBERATION ARMY 298 (Andrew Scobell, Larry M. Wortzel eds., 2006); Bajoria, supra note 70; David
Cohen, China’s Myanmar Problem, THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 17, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/chinapower/chinas-myanmar-problem/.
81
Bert, supra note 30, at 268-69.
82
Novosejt, supra note 67, at 22.
83
STOREY, supra note 79, at 161. It should be noted that in the past few years, Burma has made a
point of seeking trade partnerships with other major powers to leverage China’s influence. See generally
Simon Shuster, Why are Burmese Scientists Studying Missile Technology in Moscow?, TIME (Dec. 7,
2011), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2101404,00.html.
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Policy Shifts

Scholars criticize Western responses to Burma’s ongoing human
rights abuses as serving only to punish civilian populations and ineffective in
curbing human rights abuses or countering China’s large influence in the
region.84 In the interest of offsetting Chinese monopolizing influence in
Burma, ASEAN nations have largely welcomed a larger U.S. role in
Burma.85
In 2010, the Burmese government made unprecedented political
changes. It released Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, transferred power
to a nominally civilian government led by Thein Sein, and granted amnesty
to political prisoners.86 Burma began making democratic reforms to gain the
support of Western states. 87 Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of
democratic reform was recognition of Aung San Suu Kyi’s election to
Parliament in April 2012.88
All of these factors—China’s growing influence in the region, lack of
desirable results from other isolationist policies, ASEAN’s welcome of more
U.S. presence, and small democratic reforms by Burma—recalibrated
Western policy. Spurred by criticisms, the Obama administration pivoted on
its policy stance toward Burma in the fall of 2009. While not abandoning
sanctions altogether, the United States agreed to enter into a dialogue with
the regime.89 The United States pressured Burma to release all political
prisoners, urged it to comply with its international agreements, and pushed
for the end of human rights violations in the country.90 Other nations
responded in similar fashion.91
84

Bert, supra note 30, at 277. The ASEAN approach has also been criticized for failing to improve
the situation. See Emmerson, supra note 30, at 13.
85
INT’L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 44, at 31.
86
Timeline, supra note 6.
87
Bajoria, supra note 70.
88
Burma’s Aung San Suu Kyi wins by-election: NLD Party, BBC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17577620.
89
Steinberg, supra note 73, at 191.
90
Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, Special Briefing on U.S. Policy Toward Burma (Sept. 28, 2009) (transcript available
at http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2009/09/129698.htm).
91
The E.U. suspended nearly all of its sanctions on Burma in April 2012. Thomas Fuller & Paul
Geitner, European Union Suspends Most Myanmar Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/world/asia/eu-suspends-sanctions-on-myanmar.html?_r=1& (noting
the arms embargos would remain in place). The U.K. supported this move but made clear that the
relaxation was contingent on Burma maintaining forward democratic progress. HILL, supra note 76, at 7.
Japan resumed its development assistance program and began talks to develop a joint special economic
zone. Id. at 8. Australia revised its sanctions after the first round of political prisoner releases. Id. at 11.
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It is against the backdrop of economic disaster, civil war, political
repression, and decades of civil mistrust that Burma now seeks a welcome
back on to the international stage. Though the government has signaled
reform, the country is still recovering from decades of oppressive rule,
remnants of which still linger. With internal conflict and external relations
yet to be mended, the situation into which investors will enter is fragile. To
incentivize international investment, Burma’s Parliament passed a new
investor-friendly foreign investment law.92 The following section analyzes
whether and to what extent the 2012 Law will create a positive investment
environment both for foreign companies and Burma’s citizens.
III.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW ANALYSIS

President Thein Sein’s political reforms prompted Western nations to
ease sanctions,93 which allowed multinational corporations to invest in this
resource-rich country. But most companies held their capital at bay until the
2012 Law passed, which was meant to be friendlier to foreign investors.94
President Thein Sein reported that foreign investment quintupled from fiscal
year 2011/2012 to 2012/2013.95 After months of debate in Parliament,
President Thein Sein approved Myanmar’s new foreign investment law on
November 2, 2012.96
Section A examines the substantive changes to the investment regime
made by the 2012 Law, focusing on tax incentives, relaxed requirements for
joint ventures, land grant extensions, and requirements to respect
international labor and environmental standards. After an examination of
enforcement mechanisms, Section B concludes that the law is deficient in
ensuring labor, human rights, and environmental protections in foreign
investment projects. These shortcomings premise the recommendations
contained in Part IV.
92

Aung Hla Tun, supra note 27.
Burma Sanctions, supra note 4.
94
Szep, supra note 16.
95
Foreign Investment Jumps Fivefold in Burma, THE IRRAWADDY (May 13, 2013),
http://www.irrawaddy.org/archives/34427.
96
Aung Hla Tun, supra note 27; the legislative process surrounding the bill was described as “a
tussle involving a government eager to attract foreign investment, tycoons determined to protect their
monopolies, and small businesses keen not to be shut out.” Burma’s Thein Sein: Foreign Investment Bill to
be Finalized in ‘Days’, VOICE OF AMERICA (Oct. 21, 2012), http://blogs.voanews.com/breakingnews/2012/10/21/burmas-thein-sein-foreign-investment-bill-to-be-finalized-in-days/ (last visited Mar. 25,
2014); Aung Hla Tun, Myanmar Foreign Investment Bill in Parliament Again, REUTERS (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/01/us-myanmar-investment-idUSBRE8A005H20121101.
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Notable Changes to the 1988 Foreign Investment Law

The 2012 Foreign Investment law repealed the 1988 Foreign
Investment Laws of Myanmar (hereinafter “1988 Law”).97 One of the first
sections of the 2012 Law outlines the goals of the revision: to create jobs,
encourage competition with foreigners, develop infrastructure and
technology, and produce and export minerals.98 The 2012 Law focuses on
environmental conservation and the development of clean and sustainable
energy as important principles of foreign investment–principles that were
absent in the 1988 version of the law.99 These changes may reflect a shift in
thinking from short-term to long-term development goals and respect for
international standards and norms. The following section considers the
law’s changes, in light of Burma’s developmental objectives, in a subjectby-subject discussion of permitted types and patterns of investment projects,
standards for approving and overseeing projects, financial incentives, and
new labor and land provisions.
1.

Permitted Investments and Activities

The 1988 Law contained few, if any, prohibitions on investment
projects that are harmful to the environment or citizens. It gave full
discretionary powers to the government to decide which investment projects
were appropriate, with few guidelines.100
The 2012 Law contains new restrictions on certain economic
activities.101 It restricts economic activities prejudicial to the traditional
cultures and customs of the ethnic nationalities, 102 prejudicial to public
health, 103 and prejudicial to the natural resources, environment and
biodiversity.104 It also limits private investment in many sectors, as outlined
97

Union of Myanmar Foreign Investment Law, 1988, No. 10 (Myan.), available at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/Foreign_Investment_Law-10-88-en.pdf [hereinafter Foreign
Investment Law 1988].
98
Foreign
Investment
Law
2012,
No.
21,
ch.3
(Myan.),
available
at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf.
99
See id. at ch. 4 § 8(h)(j)(l).
100
The only discernable guidelines for approving investment projects are found in Chapter VI, which
instructs the MIC to consider “facts such as financial credibility, economic justification of the business
enterprise and appropriateness of technology.” Foreign Investment Law 1988, supra note 97 at ch. VI § 9.
101
Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 98, at ch. 2.
102
Id. at ch. 2 § 4(a).
103
Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, ch. 2 § 4(b) (Myan.), available at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf.
104
Id. at ch. 2 § 4(c).
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in the Myanmar State-owned Economics Enterprises (“SOEE”) law, subject
only to government-granted exemptions.105 These sectors include oil and
gas, hard minerals, telecommunications, banking and insurance,
broadcasting, and air and railway services.106
The Foreign Investment Rules and Myanmar Investment Commission
Notification, which outline new foreign investment regulations, detail three
separate categories of investment and the activities that fall within each of
them.107 Category I activities are presumed to be prohibited by foreign
investment projects. 108 These activities include, but are not limited to:
digging shallow oil and gas wells up to 1,000 feet, small-scale agriculture,
electrical generation under ten megawatts, production of arms and
explosives, and exploration and production of jade and gemstones.109 The
Myanmar Investment Commission (“MIC”) has the discretionary authority
to approve such activities by foreign projects if it benefits the state, its
citizens, and specifically the ethnic citizens.110 The proposals for Category I
activities must be approved by local groups, regional administrative bodies,
and the central government. 111 Foreign capital must not exceed eighty
percent of the joint venture between the foreign investor and a citizen, but
there is no limit to foreign capital when the venture is between a foreigner
and the state.112
Category II activities are those that are only permitted as joint
ventures with Burma citizens.113 These activities include large-scale mining,
exploration and production of industrial minerals, certain real estate projects,
production and distribution of most food products, and livestock or farming
activities carried out on land owned by Burma citizens.114 As in Category I
activities, foreign capital in a joint venture with citizens may not exceed
eighty percent.115
105

RAJA BOSE & NICHOLAS WATTS, K&L GATES, MYANMAR’S NEW FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW

(2012).

106

Id.; Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 103, at ch. 2 § 4(h)-(j).
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL PLANNING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, Notification No. 11/2013, FOREIGN INVESTMENT RULES (2013);
MYANMAR INVESTMENT COMMISSION, THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, Notification No.
1/2013 (2013); ALLEN & OVERY LLP, MYANMAR ISSUES FOREIGN INVESTMENT RULES 2 (2013).
108
ALLEN & OVERY LLP, supra note 107, at 3.
109
Id.; JAMES FINCH, DFDL LEGAL & TAX SERVICES, MYANMAR’S NEW FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW,
RULES AND NOTIFICATIONS 3 (2013).
110
ALLEN & OVERY LLP, supra note 107, at 3.
111
FINCH, supra note 109, at 3.
112
ALLEN & OVERY LLP, supra note 107, at 3.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
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Category III activities are those that are permitted subject only to
conditions by the relevant ministry.116 Some of these activities include
mineral production, electrical production, communication services, and
commercial real estate.117 There is some overlap between Category II and
Category III activities—for example, a foreign entity must undertake some
projects jointly with a Burma citizen, subject to conditions prescribed by a
government ministry. 118 Some activities listed in Category III, such as
exploration and production of minerals, oil, and natural gas require an
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment.119 Foreign investors may
engage in certain activities, such as coal production, only when undertaken
as a joint venture with the state.120
These additional categories of restricted activities reflect the
government’s desire to prevent harmful activities that contravene
international human rights standards.121 Presumably, these expectations are
codified for the benefit of potential investors as well as concerned citizens.
The 2012 Law, however, allows prohibited activities if approved by the
government. 122 This change gives the government discretion to allow
investment projects in any sector, subject to approval by local civilian
organizations and the appropriate government agencies. 123 Discretion,
however, opens the door for potential corruption. Corruption is
commonplace in Burma, where government officials expect to be paid off by
businesses in exchange for licenses and a faster bureaucratic process.124
Then again, “[…discretion] can be useful when exercised by competent and

116

Id. at 4.
Id.
118
See id. at 3-4.
119
Id. at 5.
120
Id. at 4.
121
These international standards are codified by convention, and include Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948); United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), 46 I.L.M.
1013 (2007); International Labour Organization Forced Labour Convention, No. 29 (June 28, 1930);
International Labour Organization Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, No. 182 (June 17,
1999); International Labour Organization Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, No. 169 (1998).
122
Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, ch. 2 § 5 (Myan.), available at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf.
123
ALLEN & OVERY LLP, supra note 107, at 3.
124
Video Showing Rampant Burmese Police Corruption Leaked Online, FRANCE 24 THE OBSERVERS
(Nov. 9, 2012), http://observers.france24.com/content/20120920-burma-opens-video-showing-policecorruption-leaked-internet-myanmar-amateur-traffic-bribes-bus-yangon-rangoon; Zin Linn, Burma’s
President Urges an End to Corruption, ASIANCORRESPONDENT.COM (Aug. 15, 2012),
http://asiancorrespondent.com/87663/burmas-president-urges-to-stop-bribery-for-clean-government/.
117
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experienced decision makers in a transparent process.” 125 Requiring
approval by certain civil society groups allows civilians to veto investment
projects that may affect their lands or livelihoods. This development is a
positive step that works to gain indigenous communities’ input in
development decisions, per the requirements laid out in international
conventions.126 However, it is unclear whether and how this mechanism will
be enforced. Given Burma’s long history of corruption and lack of
transparency, it is not clear that this restriction will be effective in practice.
2.

Permitted Patterns of Investment

Chapter 5 of the 2012 Law outlines the permitted “Patterns of
Investment,” which is the successor to the 1988 Law’s “Form of
Organization” chapter. Both chapters set forth guidelines under which
foreign investments can be formed and carried out.127 Some of the main
changes made to attract foreign capital occur in this section. The 1988 law
envisioned foreign investment with up to 100% foreign capital as well as
joint ventures between foreigners and citizens, which required a minimum of
thirty-five percent foreign capital.128 The 2012 Law envisions similar types
of investment:
(1) a sole proprietorship wholly owned by a foreign investor
supplying 100% foreign capital; (2) a joint venture in the form
of either a partnership or limited company with a citizen or
government department or organization, in which the amount of
foreign capital invested is to be agreed to by the foreign
investor and the citizen investor; and (3) operating in a system
mutually agreed upon according to a deed of contract.129
125

Jared Bissinger, Investment, discretion and Burma’s future economic development, DEMOCRATIC
VOICE OF BURMA (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.dvb.no/analysis/investment-discretion-and-burma%
E2%80%99s-future-economic-development/24904 (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
126
“1. The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the process of
development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and the lands they occupy
or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent possible, over their own economic, social and
cultural development. In addition, they shall participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation
of plans and programmes for national and regional development which may affect them directly.”
International Labour Organization Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, No. 169 (1998), art 7 (1).
127
Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 122, at ch. 5; Foreign Investment Law 1988, No. 10, ch.
4 (Myan.), available at http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/Foreign_Investment_Law-10-88-en.pdf.
128
Foreign Investment Law 1988, supra note 127, at ch. 4.
129
MYANMAR LEGAL SERVICES LIMITED & CHANDLER & THONG-EK, DOING BUSINESS IN MYANMAR
1 (2012).

JUNE 2014

FOREIGNERS IN BURMA

847

The 2012 Law departs from the 1988 Law in that it does not set a minimum
requirement of foreign capital in joint ventures.130 This difference allows for
a more flexible pattern of investment depending on the abilities and needs of
foreign investors as well as local partners. The MIC, however, still has final
approval of the ratio of foreign to local capital, and a specified amount of
foreign capital is still required in certain restricted sectors.131
The 2012 Law outlines, for the first time, the duties and
responsibilities of investors.132 It prescribes eleven investor duties, from
abiding by the existing domestic laws of Burma to refraining from
significantly changing the topography of the land.133 It outlines seven rights
given to investors, such as the right to sell all or part of their shares, and the
right to apply to the MIC to settle grievances.134
However, investors gain many of these rights only upon approval of
the MIC, which leaves a large zone of uncertainty for investors.135 Wide
discretion opens the door for corruption to permeate relationships between
investors and members of the MIC during the approval process.136
The 1988 Law failed to provide any dispute settlement mechanism,
which created an uncertain legal environment for foreign investors.137 The
2012 Law sets forth available methods for dispute resolution, allowing for
disputes to be settled according to the terms of the contract. 138 This
development allows investors to add international arbitration clauses in their
contracts, which creates a more certain and attractive legal environment than
having to litigate disputes under Burmese law. 139
This set of provisions attempts to set up an attractive environment for
potential investors by allowing more flexible patterns of investment. The
2012 Law attempts to level the playing field, drawing in investors by letting
them play on their own terms.
130

Foreign Investment Law 1988, supra note 127, at ch. 14 § 6(a)(ii).
Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, ch. 5 § 10 (Myan.),
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf; ALLEN &
supra note 107, at 3-4.
132
Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 131, at ch. 8.
133
Id. at chs. 8, 17.
134
Id. at chs. 8, 18.
135
Id.
136
Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, chs. 8, 18 (Myan.),
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf.
137
See generally Foreign Investment Law 1988, No. 10, ch. 4 (Myan.),
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/Foreign_Investment_Law-10-88-en.pdf.
138
Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 136, at ch. 19.
139
Id.; Bissinger, supra note 125.
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Activities of the MIC

The 1988 Law created the MIC, which is responsible for reviewing
applications for investment proposals, issuing permits upon approval,
responding to complaints lodged by investors, and enforcing the provisions
of the law.140 The 2012 revisions to the 1988 Law retain the MIC, but alter
its composition.141 The 2012 Law mandates that non-government servants
have seats on the MIC142 in addition to government employees,143 and that
the Vice President, Secretary, and Joint-Secretaries of the MIC be
nominated.144 This shift could reflect the Pyidaungsu Government’s desire
to improve the MIC’s credibility by bringing in non-government actors to
oversee the process of assessing investment projects and enforcing the
provisions of the foreign investment law. The non-government members,
however, are on the government’s payroll.145 Thus, these non-government
members may be susceptible to inappropriate government influence.
The addition of non-government actors to the process may limit the
potential for corruption in relationships between investors and the MIC,
especially given the MIC’s wide latitude to dictate the scope and substance
of investment projects.146 President Thein Sein has outwardly opposed the
systematic use of bribery that exists at every level of government, and this
new requirement for the MIC likely is a step in the battle against corruption,
imposing another check on accountability against government officials.147
Non-government officials, however, are not immune to bribery, and the
effectiveness of this accountability check is questionable.148
The 2012 Law sets out new and detailed requirements for the MIC.149
Going forward, the MIC is required to make a report of its activities every
140

Foreign Investment Law 1988, supra note 137, at ch. 6.
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Investment
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2012,
No.
21,
ch.
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(Myan.),
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http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf.
142
Id. at ch. 6 § 11(a).
143
Foreign Investment Law 1988, No. 10, ch. 5 § 7 (Myan.), available at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/Foreign_Investment_Law-10-88-en.pdf.
144
Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 141, at ch. 6 § 11(a)(2) (noting that Chapter 6 does not
prescribe the procedure for nomination and election to the MIC).
145
Id. at ch. 6 § 11(b).
146
See generally Bissinger, supra note 125.
147
Zin Linn, supra note 124.
148
A government official states bribery is not limited to the public sector, but pervades the private
sphere as well. Paul Vrieze, Burma Ranked Among Most Corrupt Countries, THE IRRAWADDY (Dec. 6,
2012), http://www.irrawaddy.org/corruption/burma-ranked-among-most-corrupt-countries.html.
149
Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, chs. 7, 9 (Myan.), available at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf.
141

JUNE 2014

FOREIGNERS IN BURMA

849

six months.150 Additionally, the 2012 Law sets forth time limits under which
the MIC must either accept or reject proposals.151 The MIC must monitor
the mineral resources that are under the contracted land, whether or not they
are related to the contracted project or works.152 These sections clarify what
investors can expect from the MIC and how long they will have to wait for
an assessment of their proposals.153
The 2012 Law seems to give investors more rights and privileges,
subject to certain conditions.154 For example, the prior version of the law
gave the MIC the power to “prescribe” the bank used,155 while the 2012 Law
only gives the MIC the power to reject a proposed bank.156 The ability to
choose which bank to use is a boon for investors, theoretically allowing
flexibility to make financial decisions. The MIC, however, still maintains
the power to reject a proposed bank, 157 highlighting the MIC’s vast
discretionary power to dictate investors’ activities.
The 1988 Law did not outline any rights of the MIC to enforce the
laws against violating investors. The 2012 Law outlines penalties the MIC
may issue to investors who violate laws and regulations.158 The MIC may
issue a warning, temporarily suspend tax exemption and relief, revoke the
permit, or blacklist the investor from obtaining a permit in the future. 159
This clarification allows the investor to determine what penalties she may
face if she fails to uphold the law.
Generally, the 2012 Law outlines more detailed duties and rights of
both the investors as well as the MIC. Investors, however, only hold many
of these rights subject to the discretionary approval of the MIC. While the
changes to the MIC are certainly notable, the 2012 Law provides more
dramatic shifts to the financial incentive regime.

150

Id. at ch. 7 § 12(d).
Id. at ch. 9 § 20.
152
Id. at ch. 7 § 12(h).
153
Id. at ch. 9 § 20.
154
See generally Bissinger, supra note 125.
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Foreign Investment Law 1988, No. 10, ch. 6 § 15 (Myan.),
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/Foreign_Investment_Law-10-88-en.pdf.
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Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, ch. 7 § 13(f) (Myan.),
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Id. at ch. 18.
159
Id. at ch. 18 § 42.
151

available

at

available

at

850

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

4.

VOL. 23 NO. 3

Financial Incentives

The 2012 Law provides more flexibility for investors in their financial
dealings. Under the 1988 Law, foreign investors were required to use the
state-owned Myanmar Insurance Corporation, 160 but the 2012 Law provides
investors the right to use any insurance agency that is allowed to do business
in Burma.161 The Myanmar Insurance Corporation was the sole insurance
company for forty years, but in September 2012 Burma announced that it
would grant licenses to twelve private domestic insurance companies.162
Once the sector develops, foreigners can choose insurance providers.
The 1988 Law grants foreign investors tax exemptions for up to three
consecutive years in order to encourage investment.163 The chapter allows
for an extension of this tax holiday if the investment is “beneficial” for the
state, and an exemption from other payments such as customs duties and
export taxes.164 The 2012 Law extends the tax holiday from three years to
five years in an attempt to even further encourage investment. 165 Its
exemptions and restrictions are identical to those contained in the 1988 Law;
for instance, companies can claim exemptions on only fifty percent of their
profits on products produced for export. 166 One of the most important
provisions of the 2012 Law is the discretionary power given to the MIC to
“prescribe investment activities which are not required for tax exemption
and relief.”167 These select exemptions are important because blanket tax
holidays have the potential to undercut much of Burma’s desperately needed
tax revenue.168 The analysis, however, notes that like all other discretionary

160

Foreign Investment Law 1988, No. 10, ch. 8 § 19 (Myan.), available at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/Foreign_Investment_Law-10-88-en.pdf.
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Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, ch. 10 § 23 (Myan.), available at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf.
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Kyaw Hsu Mon, Private Insurance Industry Finds its Feet, THE IRRAWADDY (Nov. 15, 2013),
http://www.irrawaddy.org/z_lifestyle/private-insurance-industry-finds-feet.html.
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Foreign Investment Law 1988, supra note 160, at ch. 10.
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BOSE & WATTS, supra note 105; Burma: Amended Foreign Investment Law Published, U.S.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205403415
_text.
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powers of the MIC, there is potential for abuse, and a transparent process of
assessing which companies are eligible for exemptions is necessary.169
The 1988 Law required foreign investors to open both foreign
currency and kyat bank accounts in a bank prescribed by the MIC, 170
whereas the 2012 Law allows them to use a foreign currency accounts or a
kyat accounts.171 The 1988 Law imposed the same requirement on foreign
citizens employed by “any such economic organization,” while the 2012
Law also allows foreign citizens to choose whether to open a foreign
currency or kyat account. 172 Again, the 2012 Law provides financial
incentives for investors by extending blanket tax holidays and offering more
choices to foreigner investors regarding their financial dealings.
5.

Labor and Land Provisions

The 1988 Law requires foreign investors to hire Burmese citizens for
in-country permitted activities, except for experts and technicians (who may
be hired from abroad). 173 The 2012 Law prescribes more detailed
requirements. For example, the law requires that all unskilled hires must be
citizens, 174 and that investors provide training and courses for citizen
employees. 175 It also strictly prescribes certain percentages of skilled
workers, technicians, and staff who must be Burmese citizens, with
requirements increasing over time. 176 Section 24(a) requires that when
hiring skilled workers, investors hire at least twenty-five percent citizen
laborers within the first two years of the project, at least fifty percent of
citizen laborers within the second two years, and at least seventy-five
percent within the following two years.177
169

Id.
Foreign Investment Law 1988, supra note 166, at ch. 14 § 27.
171
Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 167, at ch. 17 § 40(b).
172
Foreign Investment Law 1988, No. 10, ch. 14 § 28 (Myan.), available at
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2012, supra note 167, at ch. 17 § 41.
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Foreign Investment Law 1988, supra note 172, at ch. 9 § 20.
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Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, ch. 11 § 24(c) (Myan.), available at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf.
175
Id. at ch. 11 § 24(b).
176
Id. at ch. 11 § 24.
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The 2012 Law also requires that investors pay Burmese citizenemployees the same wages as foreign employees of similar professional
levels,178 and that investors obey labor laws.179 The requirement that foreign
investors obey labor laws is likely intended to guard against the use of
forced labor, which is common in Burma’s public works sector.180 While
the possibility of this provision leading to domestic investigations of forced
labor is low given the weakness of Burma’s judiciary,181 it may very well
provide further support for ILO investigations into forced labor and
violations of international labor law.182
The 1988 Law did not contain a provision on land leases. However,
according to recently developed common practice, investors may lease land
for up to thirty-year terms with two available extensions of five years
each.183 The 2012 Law extends the terms and allows land leases of up to
seventy years, up from the prior forty year maximum.184 Now investors
have the right to obtain a land grant for up to fifty years and to extend that
initial grant twice, for up to ten years each 185 ⎯a change specifically
designed to attract foreign investors. 186 Even longer leases of land are
available in rural or less developed areas, subject to the discretion of the
MIC.187 This section is a significant attraction for foreign investors who are
not allowed to own land in Burma 188 and because the government has
engaged in rampant illegal land seizures for investment projects in the
past.189
The government extended land grant terms to attract foreign capital by
guaranteeing investors more time to get a return on their investment.
178

Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 174, at ch. 11 § 24(f).
Id. at ch. 11 § 26(b).
180
Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, ch. 11 §§ 24(f), 26(b) (Myan.), available at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf.
181
See supra Part I.
182
See generally Forced Labour Complaints on the Rise in Burma, says ILO, MIZZIMA NEWS (June
9, 2011), http://archive-2.mizzima.com/news/inside-burma/5390-forced-labour-complaints-on-the-rise-inburma-says-ilo.html.
183
Aung Hla Tun, supra note 27.
184
Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 180, at ch. 14 § 32.
185
Id.
186
Foreign Investment Law 2012, No. 21, ch. 14 §§ 31, 32 (Myan.), available at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/Foreign_Investment_Law-21-2012-en.pdf.
187
BOSE & WATTS, supra note 105.
188
The Transfer of Immovable Property Restriction Act, 1987, No. 1 (Myan.), available at
http://displacementsolutions.org/wp-content/uploads/THE-TRANSFER-OF-IMMOVEABLE-PROPERTYRESTRICTION-ACT-1987.pdf.
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Abuses, Land Grabs Ongoing in Burma, Says NGO, MIZZIMA NEWS (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://archive-2.mizzima.com/news/regional/8336-abuses-land-grabs-ongoing-in-burma-says-ngo.html.
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Alternatively, the new requirements for hiring Burmese workers are oriented
toward developing a civilian workforce.
Reflecting her view that
responsible investment has the potential to improve the lives of Burma’s
citizens, Aung San Suu Kyi recently urged investors and corporate
executives to invest in the country’s human resources and develop small and
medium enterprises.190 The Burmese worker requirement could help to
grow employment opportunities, creating a skilled workforce that can
support the country’s economy.
B.

Shortcomings of the New Foreign Investment Law

The 2012 Law champions environmental protection, respect for
international labor standards as outlined by the ILO, and the protection of
ethnic nationalities.191 It lacks detailed enforcement mechanisms, however,
which are necessary to protect these interests. The law lacks any clear
mechanism for legal remedies available to citizens who are illegally
removed from their land to accommodate a foreign investment project, or for
the investors themselves in the event that a contract is terminated in
violation of the 2012 Law.192
Burma’s history of internal adjudication suggests that the country will
not honor these commitments. 193 Burma is not a signatory to certain
international treaties that protect investors’ rights, such as the Washington
Convention or the Energy Charter Treaty.194 The judicial system in Burma
lacks transparent processes and clear rules and is not an ideal forum for
foreigners to attempt to enforce their rights. 195 Without a binding
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Shibani Mahtani, Suu Kyi Seeks Responsible Investment in Myanmar, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 21, 2013),
http://stream.wsj.com/story/latest-headlines/SS-2-63399/SS-2-333789/.
191
Foreign Investment Law 2012, supra note 186, at chs. 1, 4, 11.
192
Construction of the Yadana pipeline in the 1990’s through Burma led to a series of serious human
rights violations, including forced relocation of villagers along the route of the pipeline. In 1996, villagers
filed a class action lawsuit against Unocal, a California oil company, in federal district court for subjecting
them to relocation, forced labor, torture, rape, and murder. Manuel Velasquez, Unocal in Burma, SANTA
CLARA UNIVERSITY (Nov. 3, 2005), http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/focusareas/business/Unocal-inBurma.html.
193
See supra Part I.
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BOSE & WATTS, supra note 105, at 4; Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States (“Washington Convention”), Oct. 14, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S.
159, 17 U.S.T. 1270; Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”), Apr. 16, 1988, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95.
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BOSE & WATTS, supra note 105, at 4; James Ross, Burma Push for Freedom is Held Back by its
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international treaty, foreign investors will have to utilize Burmese law in
settling disputes unless another method is set forth in the contract.196
Scholar and international human rights litigator Terry Collingsworth
highlighted some of the difficulties in enforcing human rights norms, noting
“[a]nother shortcoming of the contemporary regime is that most human
rights instruments focus on the conduct of the governments and assume that
they will adequately enforce national criminal and civil laws against private
actors.”197 There are, however, two implicit problems with this assumption.
First, foreign companies have the option to choose under what conditions
and under what legal regime disputes involving them will be addressed:198
Multinational corporations seeking to enforce commercial
rights enjoy the tremendous advantage of being able to opt out
of national legal systems that are corrupt, unreliable, or nonfunctioning. For example, an oil company forming a joint
venture with the government of Burma can require the
government to agree that all disputes be resolved using the
English legal system, applying the substantive law of England.
Meanwhile, Burmese victims of human rights violations
perpetrated by the company's security forces would be left
without recourse under national law, since it would be futile—if
not dangerous—to complain to a government whose military
engages routinely in similar abuses.199
The 2012 Law codifies this practice by expressly allowing investors to
contract out dispute resolution procedures.200
This difference in treatment highlights the second major problem.
When the government itself perpetrates the illegal conduct, and the country
lacks a robust and transparent judicial system, citizens face a practical
impediment in their ability to seek legal redress. 201 The Burmese
government historically allowed and even expressly engaged in forced labor
196
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IRRAWADDY (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.irrawaddy.org/suu-kyi/interference-in-judicial-system-harmingburmese-people-lawmakers.html.

JUNE 2014

FOREIGNERS IN BURMA

855

and relocation,202 environmental and agricultural degradation,203 and ethnic
minority oppression.204 A notable example that exemplifies many of the
previously mentioned abuses is the Yadana Pipeline. Unocal, a U.S. oil
company, and Total, a French oil company, contracted with Burma to build a
pipeline that would divert Burma’s oil into Thailand.205 Burma provided
security to the project.206 Various human rights organizations reported that
in providing security to the pipeline, the Burmese junta actually forced
ethnic citizens to work on the project and to relocate without compensation
under threat of imprisonment or execution.207
Currently, the Shwe Gas Project, a project of Daewoo International
that would funnel natural gas and oil from the Bay of Bengal into China,
raises similar concerns and has stirred mass protests.208 Villagers living
along the route of the pipeline have reported land confiscation–more land
being taken from them than what was sold, speculators coercing villagers to
sign contracts they cannot read, and the non-materialization of promised
compensation.209 There are many allegations of rampant physical and sexual
abuse, unsafe working conditions, and predatory recruiting of children
attending nearby schools who can be paid half the wage of an adult male.210
Villagers also report environmental degradation, such as foreign
subcontractor Punj Lloyd allegedly dumping waste into fishing areas,
causing a fifty percent decrease in fishing yields.211 The Yadana and Shwe
pipelines are merely two examples of investment projects that have had
disastrous consequences for the environment as well as the lives and wellbeing of the Burmese people. But this does not have to be Burma’s future.
Through their investment projects, foreign businesses have an opportunity to
“ensure equitable growth and development” for Burma by focusing on rural
development and small enterprises, and practicing transparency.212
202

Anna E. Johansson, A Silent Emergency Persists: The Limited Efficacy of U.S. Investment
Sanctions on Burma, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 317, 324 (2000).
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Due to the lack of enforcement mechanisms, the 2012 Law will not
likely improve Burmese workers’ rights or protect the environment. Foreign
investors, however, should not disregard the law’s aspirational objectives.
Indeed, investors who implement environmentally-friendly practices and
respect human rights standards will benefit economically by fostering peace
on the ground and a positive public image abroad. The following section
explores the advantages to foreign investors who respect their obligations
under Burmese law and international labor and human rights standards,213
and provides recommendations to foreign investors on how to respect these
obligations in a country with a long history of labor, human rights, and
environmental abuse.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of the new, friendlier foreign investment law, foreign
companies are increasingly attracted to the Burmese market.214 The 2012
Law protects labor and human rights.215 Guarantees against environmental
destruction are meant to provide rules for responsible foreign investment
activities.216 The author questions, however, whether domestic mechanisms
are adequate to ensure compliance with these guarantees, both for foreign
companies as well as their domestic business partners. 217 Despite the
inadequacy of domestic enforcement mechanisms in Burma, foreigners
retain the duty to respect these protections. Although they may not be
judged in a Burmese court, they will be judged in a court of public opinion.
The 2011 United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights (hereinafter “Guiding Principles”) reflect the duty of states and
businesses to protect and respect human rights and to remedy human rights
abuse.218 The Guiding Principles have been endorsed by the U.N. and are
213
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accepted as “the most internationally authoritative statement in this area.”219
They frame the responsibility to respect human rights as the responsibility of
businesses to “avoid infringing on the rights of others and [to] address
adverse impacts with which they are involved.”220
The Guiding Principles recognize the lack of existing remedies for
individuals who suffer corporate-related human rights abuse.221 As John
Ruggie, author of the Guiding Principles, states himself, “. . . beyond labor
standards that impose obligations on states, not on companies directly, no
globally endorsed rules and tools existed to further realize a right remedy in
relation to business.”222 The Guiding Principles are, by definition, merely
principles that businesses and states should follow in order to respect human
rights. Their status as principles reflects the lack of like binding obligations
under international law.223 The Guiding Principles serve as a foundation to
the emerging doctrine of business and human rights, and reflect a growing
acceptance among government and businesses that their responsibility to
respect human rights extends beyond the letter of the law, whether domestic
or international.
In an age where consumers are increasingly apt to boycott products
from companies known to violate human rights, fair labor practices, and
environmental protections,224 promoting corporate social responsibility does
not just satisfy a vague ethical obligation, but has concrete effects on a
company’s profits. One author notes the link between “practical social
values” and “public expectations regarding business conduct,” exemplified
by the fact that poor press regarding a company’s respect for human rights or
the environment “can undo hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of
marketing.”225 In the mid-1990’s, successful consumer boycotts resulted in
major American companies Reebok and Levi Strauss pulling out of Burma,
and helped contribute to the imposition of U.S. sanctions. 226 Thus,
219
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companies should not underestimate the power of consumers to demand
responsible business practices.
A company can face liability for violating human rights norms as laid
out in international law in international courts or in domestic courts through
extra-territorial jurisdiction. For instance, the litigants in Doe v. Unocal
used the Alien Tort Statute in a U.S. court227 to sue the U.S. oil company
Unocal for its complicity in atrocities such as forced relocation, forced labor,
murder, and rape committed by the Burmese army during the Yadana
pipeline project in Burma.228 After years of litigation, Unocal finally settled
out of court with the Burmese citizens for an undisclosed amount.229 The
settlement is estimated to be in the multi-million dollar range, while
Unocal’s legal fees were likely over USD 25 million.230 In 2005, the French
oil company Total settled with Burmese villagers and paid out EUR 5.2
million in compensation for their use of forced relocation in their investment
project. 231 Though courtroom doors have begun to close, litigants still
attempt to bring cases like this before domestic and international judiciaries
through statutes such as the Alien Tort Statute in the United States or in the
Spanish National Court,232 which has recognized “universal jurisdiction”
over human rights abuses that occur abroad.233
Foreign businesses should respect international standards of fair labor,
environmental protection, and human rights even without codification in
Burmese law. This obligation does not make the 2012 Law and the

227
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protections and guarantees outlined in it superfluous, as it provides specific
and concrete obligations to investors.234
In light of the previous considerations, foreign companies investing in
Burma should set up mechanisms to ensure compliance with both domestic
and international labor, environmental, and human rights standards
whenever conducting business in Burma, a country with a lurid history of
corruption and abuses. Specifically, foreign investors should: 1) agree to
undertake projects only where impact benefit agreements are successfully
negotiated; 2) proceed cautiously in Burma’s historically corrupt oil and gas
industry; and 3) engage in non-financial reporting in order to ensure
compliance with international human rights and environmental standards.
A.

Recommendation 1: Foreign Investors Should Agree to Undertake
Projects Only Where Impact Benefit Agreements are Successfully
Negotiated

Impact Benefit Agreements (“IBAs”) are voluntarily negotiated
agreements between an affected local community and the private company
that owns a project on or near land inhabited by the community.235 These
agreements are usually negotiated with little government involvement.236
IBAs serve the indigenous community by recognizing their presence and
authority; it serves the company by fostering local support for projects that
would otherwise be met with resistance.237 Points of discussion usually
center around “recognition of rights; royalty-type payments; opportunities
for employment and training; opportunities for community economic
development; and additional environmental and cultural protection
measures.”238 Foreign investors involved in development projects in Burma
can respect indigenous communities’ rights through constructive dialogue
and agreeing to terms that are beneficial to both parties.
The IBA model is consistent with international conventions and
guidelines outlining the rights of indigenous communities, particularly as
they pertain to extractive industry projects. These obligations are outlined
most robustly in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
234
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(“UNDRIP”) and in the International Finance Corporation’s Performance
Standard 7, which details the requirement of Free Prior Informed Consent
(“FPIC”).239 An increasing number of extractive industry companies are
adopting the FPIC standard in their practices.240 Of the twenty-eight oil and
mining companies surveyed in one report, five employed FPIC standards, up
from only two in a 2009 Oxfam report.241 Notably, nearly all of these
companies have faced allegations of serious human rights abuses at their
project sites in the past, and two have been the subject of Alien Tort Statute
litigation in the United States over their alleged violations of international
law.242 These companies now employ progressive policies requiring full
negotiation and cooperation with affected communities prior to project
construction in order to ensure they receive “social license” to continue.243
IBAs have been utilized successfully in Canada to deliver benefits to
indigenous communities affected by mining projects.244 Similar to Burma,
Canada has sizable indigenous populations that inhabit lands on or near
extractive industry projects. 245 Canada has a robust Environmental
Assessment (“EA”) requirement whereby companies must consult with and
accommodate affected communities, to which IBAs merely add.246 No such
robust procedural requirements exist in Burma; for that reason, the need for
239
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IBAs in Burma is even more acute.247 Canadian companies have gone
beyond the requirements of the EAs and chosen to voluntarily negotiate
IBAs because they recognize the importance of gaining “social license,” or
community support, for their projects.248 Companies engaged in extractive
industry projects in Burma will find, as Canadian companies have, that it is
actually in their best interests to surpass the bare requirements of the law.
Researchers analyzed fourteen IBAs negotiated by diamond mining
companies in Canada and assessed whether they met four general goals:
building positive relationships between the companies and Aboriginal
communities; delivering benefits to the Aboriginal community; building
capacity in the Aboriginal community; and ensuring follow-up to the
environmental assessment process.249 Between 1989 and 2007, there were
positive trends in income,250 employment and education rates, and business
opportunities within Aboriginal communities that had IBAs with mining
companies at rates that exceeded growth in the entire Northwest
Territories.251 Despite these positive trends, affected communities perceived
some shortcomings of IBAs, most notably: job training was limited to blue
collar mining positions; benefits received by the community were trinkets
and beads compared to the company’s monetary profits; the confidentiality
of IBAs prevented communities from knowing whether they received their
due; not all segments of the community were meaningfully included in the
IBA negotiation; and environmental impacts of the projects were not
mitigated.252 Foreign companies in Burma should take these critiques into
account when negotiating their IBAs.
IBAs are uniquely positioned to provide benefits to both indigenous
communities and foreign businesses in Burma. First, IBAs are negotiated
solely between the community and the business, entirely outside the
regulatory framework or purview of the state.253 Though the concept of “a
private company . . . lay[ing] claim to recognition of aboriginal rights
247
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through an unlegislated confidential agreement”254 has the potential to be
problematic, contractual recognition of indigenous rights and interests could
be an improvement to the situation of indigenous communities in Burma. In
light of the Burmese government’s violent suppression and exploitation of
indigenous communities, 255 especially for the purpose of promoting
extractive industry projects, IBAs may provide affected communities with
the recognition and autonomy they would otherwise be without if left to the
state. Secondly, IBAs that include authentic profit-sharing terms and allow
full participation by affected communities within the negotiation process
could develop local human capacity and resources that, until now, have
never been meaningfully engaged by private companies.
Historically, development projects have forced indigenous
communities off their land, with violence if necessary.256 The government
and companies have not sought affected communities’ input and have not
acknowledged their complaints—this has led to protests en masse against
investment projects.257 An IBA negotiation model could foster relationships
of trust between affected communities and private companies, decreasing the
incidents of conflict surrounding projects and leading to positive economic,
educational, and social trends.258
B.

Recommendation 2: Foreign Investors Should Proceed Cautiously in
Burma’s Historically Corrupt Oil and Gas Industry

Transparency International259 ranked Burma as the world’s third most
corrupt country in 2011 on their Corruption Perceptions Index.260 Perhaps
more than any other sector in Burma, the oil and gas sector has historically
suffered from corruption and a lack of transparent practices.261 In 1996, an
analyst from The Nation alleged that the state-run Myanmar Oil and Gas
254
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Enterprise (“MOGE”) “is the main channel for laundering the revenues of
heroin produced and exported under the control of the Burmese army.”262 In
the same year, eighty percent of the foreign direct investment in Burma was
centralized in the oil and gas sector alone.263 The requirement that foreign
investors in the oil and gas sector must partner with MOGE exposes
investors to continuing complicity in this corrupt sector.264
With much of the resource-rich land lying in territory historically
inhabited by indigenous groups,265 these groups are often forcibly relocated
by the government and subjected to violent conflict because of extractive
industry projects. 266 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (“OECD”) notes that one of the unique problems faced by
foreign investors in the extractive resources industry is the inability to
insulate themselves from local conflict surrounding their operations. 267
Investors must hire security forces to protect their employees. 268 The
Burmese army has provided security forces to past projects such as the
Yadana pipeline, where the army committed serious human rights abuses
against the community along the path of the pipeline.269 Thus, investors in
the oil and gas industry risk abusing indigenous populations through forced
relocation and violence while supporting corrupt government entities, which
runs afoul of an investor’s obligations under international law, Burmese law,
and most likely, the company’s home country’s laws. 270
Despite this risk, companies can take steps to proactively reduce their
negative impacts on local populations and the environment, and reduce their
interaction with corrupt institutions. The OECD report notes that many
companies find that diffusing local conflict is in the best interest of their
262
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projects’ stability.271 One way a company could do this is by encouraging
revenue sharing agreements between the state and the local communities
affected by the projects.272
The 2012 Law does not target anti-corruption efforts in the oil and gas
sector.273 A few of the provisions aspire to minimize the role of state
institutions in investment projects.274 The 2012 Law also bans total foreign
ownership of projects in the natural resource sector, meaning that any
foreign businesses in the extraction sector will likely be forming joint
ventures with the MOGE.275 Some analysts suggest that bringing foreign
investment to Burma may decrease corruption because foreign companies
will be subject to their countries’ own anti-corruption bills, thus raising the
standard for business dealings there.276 Foreign investors have independent
obligations not to engage in corruption stemming from sources like the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and U.K. Bribery Act.277 Companies should
therefore be aware of the risk of corruption and work hard to reduce it.
Since the 2012 Law does not attack political corruption, foreign
investors in the extraction and natural resource sectors should proceed
cautiously, being aware of the historical corruption rampant in MOGE.278
Foreign investors should be especially careful in subcontracting out security
forces, making sure to communicate standards for acceptable practices, such
as using non-lethal force, reporting any use of force, and providing medical
aid to injured persons. 279 Investors should also consider options for
diffusing local conflict beforehand by encouraging resource sharing between
MOGE and the local communities and engaging in projects that will benefit
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the local communities, such as providing social services like hospitals and
developing clean drinking water systems.280
C.

Recommendation 3: Foreign Investors Should Engage in NonFinancial Reporting to Ensure that International Labor Laws and
Environmental Protection Standards are Enforced

Provisions of the 2012 Law aim to ensure compliance with
international labor standards and guard against forced labor, consistent with
the Guiding Principles and relevant international treaties.281 The 2012 Law
requires foreign companies to train employees, pay them the same wage as
foreign employees of the same skill level, and obey relevant labor laws.282
The ILO provides a few mechanisms by which local citizens can file
complaints of these types of abuses.283 Since the complaint mechanism was
established in 2007, it has received 749 complaints as of June 2011, and the
number is dramatically increasing as more citizens become aware of the
mechanism.284 However, the ILO notes that as of February 2011 there were
five individuals who remained in prison as a result of submitting a
complaint, a sign that many people may be hesitant to report violations for
fear of retaliation by the government.285 The IHRB report notes that one of
the major concerns of the 2012 Law is that the surge of investors will be
tempted to engage in illegal land-seizures.286 An ILO report says that, while
new laws attempt to guard against this possibility by requiring people to
register their land with the government, many people in rural areas are
unaware of these requirements, and thus are unable to avail themselves of
these protections.287
In light of these concerns, it is questionable whether the government
will properly enforce such labor standards. Foreign investors should support
280
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government efforts to inform the citizen population of their land rights and
availability of complaint mechanisms, especially in rural areas of Burma.
This proactive approach complies with the international standard of free
prior informed consent.288 Advocates fear that the increasing numbers of
investment projects will accelerate the practice of land grabbing; companies
must ensure that their land contracts do not engender coercion or force and
with the assurance that citizens have been informed of their rights and have
given over free, prior informed consent.289
Human rights organizations and civil society groups continue to press
governments to require more robust reporting.290 For example, the U.S.
Department of State now requires any U.S. individual or entity that enters
into a new agreement with MOGE to notify the Department of State, and
any U.S. individual or entity that invests more than USD 500,000 in Burma
to provide annual reports detailing their human rights, worker rights, anticorruption, and environmental policies and procedures, as well as any
arrangements with security service providers, property acquisitions, and any
payments over USD 10,000 made to the government of Burma.291 As of
May 2014, eight companies submitted reports on their investment in Burma
pursuant to these requirements.292 Human rights organizations critique the
reporting requirements for not going far enough.293 Hercules Offshore, an
oil and gas company, complied with the requirements though it omitted the
names of their local business partners, thus preventing the public from
overseeing investment activities and impeding the purpose of the public
reporting requirement.294 Other companies failed to disclose due diligence
information, claiming certain privileges as a “passive” investor or as one
without full operational control over the investment.295 Even in the absence
288
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of government-sponsored reporting requirements, companies can and should
publish such due diligence reports to the public.
Companies operating in Burma should utilize non-financial reporting,
a corporate social responsibility marker whereby companies publicize their
compliance with the law.296 Dr. Onyeka Osuji, an expert on corporate social
responsibility (“CSR”), notes that non-financial reporting has become more
important, as more businesses recognize the impact of CSR on profits.297 By
providing the public with information detailing the particular company’s
activities in Burma, non-financial reporting can assure the public that
companies take CSR seriously.298 A report might include how the company
limits its environmental impact, trains its citizen employees, ensures that its
laborers are not being coercively employed, and provides social services and
benefits to the rural communities where their projects are located.299 Since
these are self-made reports, credibility is an issue.300 Osuji notes Kasky v.
Nike, where Nike paid the Fair Labor Association USD 1.5 million after it
was discovered that Nike’s report that it was paying its workers “on average
double the minimum wage” was false.301 While companies may be tempted
to fudge the numbers, the price of doing so is steep. Consider non-financial
reporting a means of corporate advertising, for “poor press regarding a
company’s respect for human rights or the environment ‘can undo hundreds
of millions of dollars worth of marketing.’”302
V.

CONCLUSION

Burma’s new foreign investment bill serves as a welcome mat to
foreign investors, ushering them in and unlocking the country’s vast
resources. The 2012 Law will surely entice companies with its tax holidays,
longer land leases, and more flexible joint partnership procedures. It may
even placate investors’ consciences with its aspirational goals of promoting
responsible investment in accordance with international human rights, fair
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labor, and environmental standards.303 The law, however, does not provide
sufficient mechanisms to ensure these protections are enforced.
Foreign companies should recognize their duty to respect domestic as
well as international standards not only out of fear of legal consequences,
but out of recognition that their profits will ultimately feel the weight of their
decisions in Burma. Consumers care about corporate social responsibility
and will be especially attuned to these issues in Burma, as the world watches
to see whether its democratic reforms are permanent. Through negotiating
IBAs, foreign investors can build trust with indigenous communities and
bypass problematic state interference in their attempt to pursue responsible
corporate policies and practices. Foreign investors should invest cautiously
in the oil and gas sector; encourage revenue sharing between the state and
local communities; and diffuse conflict on the ground through providing
social services. By engaging in non-financial reporting, companies will
model transparency and assure the world that the mistakes of the past are not
repeated.
If foreign investors take steps to ensure these protections, maybe they
can do more than just avoid a financial loss—perhaps they can play a pivotal
role in bringing a country out of economic ruin and placing it back on the
map as a flourishing society in all respects.
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